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Abstract
In contrast to conventional functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) analysis
across participants, item analysis allows generalizing the observed neural response
patterns from a specific stimulus set to the entire population of stimuli. In the present
study, we perform an item analysis on an fMRI paradigm (EmpaToM) that measures
the neural correlates of empathy and Theory of Mind (ToM). The task includes a large
stimulus set (240 emotional vs. neutral videos to probe empathic responding and
240 ToM or factual reasoning questions to probe ToM), which we tested in two large
participant samples (N = 178, N = 130). Both, the empathy-related network compris-
ing anterior insula, anterior cingulate/dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal
gyrus, and dorsal temporoparietal junction/supramarginal gyrus (TPJ) and the ToM
related network including ventral TPJ, superior temporal gyrus, temporal poles, and
anterior and posterior midline regions, were observed across participants and items.
Regression analyses confirmed that these activations are predicted by the empathy or
ToM condition of the stimuli, but not by low-level features such as video length, num-
ber of words, syllables or syntactic complexity. The item analysis also allowed for the
selection of the most effective items to create optimized stimulus sets that provide
the most stable and reproducible results. Finally, reproducibility was shown in the rep-
lication of all analyses in the second participant sample. The data demonstrate (a) the
generalizability of empathy and ToM related neural activity and (b) the reproducibility
of the EmpaToM task and its applicability in intervention and clinical imaging studies.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Aiming at elucidating the mechanisms underlying social understanding,
human neuroscience research has extensively investigated the brain
correlates of how we feel with (affective route) and know about
others (cognitive route). The affective route allows for sharing others'
emotions (empathy, affect sharing) (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006), for
example, when vicariously sharing another person's sadness or grief.
The cognitive route enables reasoning about others' mental states
(Theory of Mind, ToM, mentalizing) (Frith & Frith, 2005; Premack &Tania Singer and Philipp Kanske share senior authorship.
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Woodruff, 1978), for example, when attributing another person's
belief, desire or intention. Several meta-analyses across different
experimental approaches to both empathy and ToM have consistently
described two distinct neural networks related to these functions.
Core regions of the empathy related network are found in the
anterior insula (AI), anterior cingulate/dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
(ACC/DMPFC), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and dorsal portions of the
temporoparietal junction/supramarginal gyrus (TPJ/SMG) (Bzdok
et al., 2012; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011). The ToM related network
includes the ventral TPJ, anterior and posterior medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC), superior temporal gyrus/sulcus (STG/STS), and tempo-
ral poles (Bzdok et al., 2012; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Per-
ner, 2014). Direct contrasts of both functions confirmed these
networks with functional (Kanske, Böckler, Trautwein, & Singer, 2015)
and structural neuroimaging (Eres, Decety, Louis, & Molenberghs,
2015; Valk et al., 2017; Valk, Bernhardt, Bockler, Kanske, & Singer,
2016). These studies show that empathizing and mentalizing engage
distinct neural networks. Furthermore, brain regions also differ in cor-
tical thickness according to the subjects' capacity to share emotions
or to reason about mental states. Importantly, even though both func-
tions are essential elements of higher-level social processing, they
are not directly related. The independence of empathy and ToM
processing was demonstrated on the behavioral and the neural level
(Kanske, Böckler, Trautwein, Parianen Lesemann, & Singer, 2016).
With three notable exceptions (Bruneau, Dufour, & Saxe, 2013;
Dodell-Feder, Koster-Hale, Bedny, & Saxe, 2011; Theriault, Waytz,
Heiphetz, & Young, 2017), all previous empathy and ToM investigations
used conventional functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) ana-
lyses across participants. These analyses allow generalizing the observed
neural response patterns from the investigated participant sample to the
human population they were sampled from, if they treat subjects as
random-effect (as has become standard since the late 1990s (Friston,
Holmes, & Worsley, 1999)). However, the “fixed-effect fallacy” still
applies to the item-level (Clark, 1973), that is, it is unsubstantiated to
claim that activation patterns observed for a sample of stimuli would
generalize to the population of stimuli, for instance, that the activity
observed in an experiment eliciting emotional responses would general-
ize to the population of emotion-eliciting stimuli. Furthermore, treating
items as fixed could give single items with extreme responses dispropor-
tionate weight, thereby rendering a contrast of two conditions signifi-
cant, just because a (possibly small) subset of items in one condition
shows very strong activity, while the majority of items shows no effect.
To overcome these problems, item analyses that treat items as random
are common in many behavioral fields of study and have been shown
to be feasible for fMRI analyses as well (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler,
Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010; Bedny, Aguirre, & Thompson-Schill,
2007; Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; Theriault et al., 2017; Troiani, Stigliani,
Smith, & Epstein, 2014; Yee, Drucker, & Thompson-Schill, 2010). Thus,
Theriault et al. (2017) demonstrated positive correlations between
regions in the ToM network and subjectivity ratings of metaethical judg-
ments. Dodell-Feder et al. (2011) replicated a subject-wise analysis with
an item analysis showing generalizability for false-belief ToM stories.
Bruneau et al. (2013) performed an item-analysis on brief stories of
physical or emotional pain yielding activity in the typical empathy and
medial parts of the ToM related neural networks, respectively. This
study did not, however, compare these results with the subject-wise
analysis published previously, which would directly show replicability of
subject- and item-wise analyses (Bruneau, Pluta, & Saxe, 2012). Interest-
ingly, Bedny et al. (2007), who studied word class processing, found dif-
ferent results for subject- and item-wise analyses, demonstrating the
potential of item analysis to make theoretically important distinctions,
which in that case reconciled conflicting evidence regarding the role of
the prefrontal cortex in processing nouns vs. verbs (Bedny & Thompson-
Schill, 2006; Davis, Meunier, & Marslen-Wilson, 2004; Shapiro, Moo, &
Caramazza, 2006; Tyler, Bright, Fletcher, & Stamatakis, 2004).
In the present study, we aimed to investigate whether item-
analyses of empathy and ToM replicate the neural networks observed
with subject-wise analyses. To this end, we applied a previously vali-
dated fMRI paradigm that assesses both functions (EmpaToM)
(Kanske et al., 2015). Empathy is probed via video stimuli with brief
autobiographical narrations that are highly emotionally negative or
neutral. The negative emotional narrations included such diverse
issues as traffic accidents, involuntary pregnancy, partnership prob-
lems, diverse somatic and mental diseases and disorders, betrayal and
guilt, political violence, seeking refuge, rape, natural disaster, miscar-
riage, assault or burglary. These videos have been shown to elicit
empathic responses on a subjective, peripheral physiological, and on a
neural level. ToM reasoning is demanded in subsequent questions that
either ask for the mental states of the narrator in the previous video
or for factual reasoning about the events of the narration. The mental
state questions included first and second order, true and false
beliefs, preferences and desires, irony, sarcasm, metaphors, (white)
lies, deception and faux pas. The empathy and ToM measures were
validated in several behavioral and fMRI studies through correlations
and activation overlap with established empathy (Socio-affective
Video Taks; Klimecki, Leiberg, Lamm, & Singer, 2013) and ToM tasks
(False Belief Task; Dodell-Feder et al., 2011, Imposing Memory Task;
Kinderman, Dunbar, & Bentall, 1998) and additional overlap with
meta-analytical findings (Bzdok et al., 2012; Dodell-Feder et al., 2011;
Kinderman et al., 1998; Klimecki et al., 2013). Conceptually, it is impor-
tant for social neuroscience to show that empathy related neural activ-
ity generalizes beyond patterns only attributable to very specific
stimuli, and whether ToM tasks other than false-belief tasks (Dodell-
Feder et al., 2011) also lead to generalizable brain activation. To illus-
trate this form of generalization, as in psycholinguistics, where an item-
analysis in an experiment on verb-processing allows generalizing the
results from the limited sample of verbs tested to the population of
verbs in that language (e.g., Bedny et al., 2007), replicating the subject-
analysis results in the EmpaToM with an item-analysis would allow gen-
eralizing to the population of empathy-inducing and ToM-demanding
conversational situations. Given the breadth of the sampled situations
in the EmpaToM (240 distinct videos and questions), testing generaliz-
ability may be challenging, but could also have particular impact.
Furthermore, a principal problem in subject-analysis is that discrep-
ancies between two experimental conditions beyond the intended dif-
ference are uncontrollable confounds. Item-analysis, in contrast, allows
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specifically testing whether activations observed in a contrast of two
conditions are actually due to unintended low-level differences
between the conditions (e.g., more or less movement when telling an
emotionally negative compared to a neutral story) rather than the
intended difference (e.g., negative vs. neutral emotion). As item-specific
activation patterns are obtained, they can be associated to the specific
features of each item. Given that it is impossible to completely match
emotional and neutral stimuli without erasing the difference in emo-
tionality, ruling out the influence of such low-level features is a crucial
issue. With regard to ToM, because of the considerable overlap of ToM
related activity with regions involved in language processing, particu-
larly in the temporal cortex and TPJ (Friederici, 2011; Schurz et al.,
2014), it is critical to rule out the possibility that linguistic differences
account for the observed ToM effects. Dodell-Feder et al. (2011) con-
vincingly demonstrated this for false-belief tasks, but it is important to
test whether this holds for other language-based ToM tasks as well.
Because the EmpaToM was designed to be used in extensive longi-
tudinal designs, it includes five parallel sets of different videos and ques-
tions that allow the repeated testing of the same participants across time.
To enable usage of the EmpaToM in clinical and other settings, where
only small participant samples are available or participants can be scanned
for a very limited amount of time only, an item analysis on this large stim-
ulus set affords the chance to select the most effective items to create
stimulus sets that provide the most stable and reproducible results.
Finally, a major criticism of fMRI studies has been the limited sam-
ple size that not only reduces the likelihood to detect true effects, but
also reduces the chance that a statistically significant result reflects a
true effect (Button et al., 2013). Therefore, the present study made use
of a large sample of participants (N = 178) and checked for reproducibil-
ity of the results in a second sample (N = 130).
In sum, applying item-analyses to an fMRI task probing empathy and
ToM, the present study addresses several questions: (a) Will the item-
analyses replicate the neural networks underlying empathy and ToM as
observed with subject-wise analyses? This would argue for generalizability
of the observed brain activation patterns to the respective stimulus classes
(i.e., neutral and emotional autobiographical video narrations; factual rea-
soning and ToM questions, the latter involving a variety of ToM demands
such as irony, higher order mental state inference, false beliefs, etc.).
(b) Can activity in the observed neural networks be predicted by low-level
stimulus characteristics (i.e., number of sentences, words, syllables, charac-
ters, predicates, conjunctives, changes in tense, passive constructions, sub-
clauses, and the amount of motion)? (c) Does the item-analysis allow
creating stimulus sets including the most effective items to provide the
most stable and reproducible results? (d) Are all of the above described
results replicable in the second independent participant sample?
2 | METHODS
2.1 | Participants
Two samples of 191 and 141 German-speaking participants were
tested in the context of a large-scale longitudinal study at baseline
(ReSource Project; (Singer et al., 2016)).1 Participants were recruited
from the general public through adverts. Recruitment of Sample 1 took
place in 2012–2013 and of Sample 2 in 2013–2014. Participants had
a very good language proficiency and were not included if they were
below 20 or above 55 years of age, fulfilled the criteria for a mental or
neurological disorder (according to structured clinical interviews for
DSM-IV axis I and axis II disorders; Wittchen, Zaudig, & Fydrich,
1997) or had any contraindication for MRI scanning. Twenty-four par-
ticipants had to be excluded due to study dropout (N = 5), dropout
from MRI measurements (N = 1), or missing data due to technical,
scheduling, or health issues (N = 18).
For Sample 1, 13 participants were excluded yielding a final sam-
ple of 178 participants (age mean = 40.9 years, SD = 9.5, 106 female).
For Sample 2, 11 participants were excluded yielding a final sample of
130 participants (age mean = 40.4 years, SD = 9.0, 72 female).
The study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of
the University of Leipzig, number 376/12-ff and the Research Ethics
Committee of the Humboldt University in Berlin, numbers 2013-02,
2013-29, and 2014-10. The study was registered with the Protocol
Registration System of ClinicalTrials.gov under the title “Plasticity of
the Compassionate Brain” with the ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier:
NCT01833104. All participants signed informed consent prior to
participation.
2.2 | Stimuli and task
For details of the EmpaToM task see (Kanske et al., 2015) (Figure 1).
Each trial started with a fixation cross (1–3 s), followed by the name
of a person (2 s), who would speak in the subsequent video (~15 s).
Each participant was presented with videos of 12 persons, telling four
different stories each that corresponded to four conditions (2 × 2 fac-
torial design, negative vs. neutral emotion, ToM vs. no ToM demands).
After this, participants rated the valence of their current emotional
state (sliding scale from negative to neutral to positive; 4 s) and how
much compassion2 they felt for the person in the previous video (slid-
ing scale from none to very much; 4 s). A second fixation cross (1–3 s)
was followed by a multiple choice question with three response
options (one correct). These questions demanded either the attribu-
tion of mental states or factual reasoning (ToM vs. factual reasoning).
Participants had to respond within 14 s. For example, stories and
questions, see Data S1. After a third fixation cross (0–2 s), participants
were asked to rate their confidence, that their decision was done cor-
rect (4 s) to allow assessing metacognitive abilities (Molenberghs,
Trautwein, Bockler, Singer, & Kanske, 2016; Valk et al., 2016). In the
present study we focused on the main empathy and ToM measures,
that is, comparing emotional with neutral videos and ToM with factual
reasoning questions (see (Kanske et al., 2015) for a validation of these
contrasts).
The total stimulus set of the EmpaToM task comprised 240 videos
and questions showing 60 different narrators in 4 conditions (see
Figure 2). Based on this set, five parallel versions were created that
each contained a different set of 12 narrators in 4 conditions (yielding
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48 different videos and questions per set). The parallel sets were mat-
ched with regard to affect ratings, concern ratings, RTs, errors, confi-
dence ratings, video lengths and linguistic characteristics of the
questions (number of words, characters, predicates, changes in tense,
complexity of the sentences [number of main and subordinate clau-
ses], number of passive sentence constructions, and number of con-
junctives), see (Kanske et al., 2015)). The five sets were randomly
assigned to the participants such that each set (of 48 videos and ques-
tions) was seen by a fifth of the participants in Samples 1 and 2.
2.3 | MRI data acquisition
Data were acquired on a 3 T MRI scanner (Siemens Magnetom Verio,
Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany) using a 32 channel
head coil. Functional images were acquired with a T2*-weighted
echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR = 2,000 ms; TE = 27 ms, Flip
Angle 90, matrix = 70 × 70 mm, FOV = 210 mm). Within one TR,
37 axial slices of 3 mm were acquired. In addition, we collected a
high-resolution structural image (1 × 1 × 1 mm) with a T1-weighted
MPRAGE sequence.
2.4 | Behavioral data analysis
Repeated measures analyses of variance were calculated across sub-
jects and across items. In particular, we contrasted valence ratings
after emotional and neutral videos as an indicator of empathic
responding and analyzed performance (RTs and accuracies) after ToM
questions as an indicator of ToM capacity. Each subject contributed
ratings and performance measures in these conditions, averaged
across all items. Complementarily, each item (i.e., narrator, each of
which told four different stories) contributed measures in each condi-
tion, averaged across all participants.
2.5 | fMRI data analysis
Data preprocessing and statistical analyses were performed with
SPM 8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) running in a MATLAB 7.6
environment (Mathworks Inc., Sherbon MA). Functional images
were coregistered to the SPM single-subject canonical EPI image,
slice-time corrected and realigned to the mean image volume for
motion correction. The high-resolution structural image was cor-
egistered to the SPM single-subject canonical T1 image and then to
the average functional image. Normalization parameters of the
structural image into the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
space were used for spatial normalization of the functional images.
These images were resampled to isotropic 3 × 3 × 3 mm voxels and
smoothed with an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian Kernel.
The statistical analyses were performed by using the general lin-
ear model. For the subject-wise analysis, onset and duration of the
four video types and their corresponding questions were modeled.
These regressors were convolved by a canonical hemodynamic
F IGURE 1 EmpaToM trial sequence. Emotional and neutral videos with and without ToM demands (2 × 2 design) are followed by valence
and compassion ratings, ToM and factual reasoning questions, and a confidence rating (adopted from Kanske et al. (2015)). This study
investigated the effects of subject- and itemwise analyses on the empathy and theory of mind contrasts. Empathy was tested via emotionally
negative versus neutral videos and theory of mind was tested via mental state versus factual reasoning questions. ToM, Theory of Mind
2614 THOLEN ET AL.
response function. Six regressors accounting head movement effects
were modeled as covariates of no interest. RobustWLS Toolbox
(Diedrichsen & Shadmehr, 2005) was used to reduce potential noise-
artifact. Contrast images for empathy (emotional vs. neutral videos)
and ToM (ToM vs. nonToM questions) were calculated by applying
linear weights to the parameter estimates and entered into one-
sample t-tests for random effects analysis.
The item analyses were performed for each contrast separately
by modeling the emotional and neutral videos, and the ToM and fac-
tual reasoning questions on the individual subject level. Each analysis
resulted in 48 beta maps per subject (12 narrators × 4 conditions).
The beta maps were averaged across the subjects within the five par-
allel versions (see Figure 2) to receive one single beta map per narra-
tor and condition. For each of the five subgroups, this method yielded
48 beta maps at which each beta map comprised a mean beta value
across subjects at every voxel, adding up to 240 beta maps in total.
For the second-level random effects analyses, we modeled the main
contrasts between the condition differences (emotional vs. neutral
videos, ToM vs. nonToM questions) together with the factor of sub-
groups as covariates of no interest in order to account for the depen-
dencies between the 240 beta maps corresponding to the five
groups of participants. The main contrasts were tested with two sam-
ple t-tests.
The results for the subject-wise as well as the item-wise analyses
were thresholded at p < .001 at voxel-level together with an FWE
(family-wise error) correction (p < .05) at the cluster level.
2.6 | Regression analysis
For both contrasts, regions of interest (ROI) (N = 46, 23 ToM,
23 empathy) were defined on the basis of the subject-wise random
effects analyses of Sample 1 (see Table 1 for empathy, Table 2 for
ToM). They were used to extract the beta values from Sample 2 for
F IGURE 2 EmpaToM stimulus material. The overall stimulus material of the EmpaToM task contains 240 videos and questions with
60 different narrators in 4 conditions (emotional vs. neutral, ToM vs. nonToM), allocated to one of five parallel subsets. Each subset contains
12 different narrators in 4 conditions. The subsets are matched with regard to affect ratings, concern ratings, RTs, errors, confidence ratings, video
lengths, and linguistic characteristics of the questions (number of words, characters, predicates, changes in tense, complexity of the sentences,
number of passive sentence constructions, and number of conjunctives) (see Kanske et al., 2015). Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the
five subsets, so that each subset was seen by a fifth of the participants in Sample 1 (N = 178) and Sample 2 (N = 130). ToM, Theory of Mind
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TABLE 1 Whole brain subject- and item-wise random effects results for Videos Emotional > Neutral. The results are reported at a voxel-level
threshold of p < .001 uncorrected together with an FWE-corrected cluster threshold of p < .05
H
MNI coordinates
x y z T Z Cluster
Subject-wise Group#1
Inferior frontal gyrus L −48 39 −9 10.68 >8.21 1,027
Middle frontal L −42 15 45 10.04 >8.21
Anterior insula L −36 21 −6 8.58 7.82
Superior medial frontal cortex L −3 33 51 10.53 >8.21 1,257
Superior medial frontal R 9 21 57 8.69 >8.21
Inferior frontal gyrus R 51 30 −6 10.01 >8.21 737
Middle frontal R 42 21 39 6.96 6.53
Anterior insula R 30 24 −15 6.64 6.27
Ventral striatum R 9 3 0 6.29 5.97 153
Ventral striatum L −6 −3 0 6.16 5.86
Caudate L −12 6 12 6.12 5.82
Caudate R 12 6 12 6 5.82
Middle cingulate 0 −18 39 8.25 7.58 82
Middle temporal cortex L −54 −30 −12 6.08 5.79 26
TPJ-angular/supramarginal gyrus R 63 −48 33 9.71 >8.21 448
Middle temporal cortex R 60 −57 9 7.44 6.93
TPJ-angular/supramarginal gyrus L −54 −51 33 12.49 >8.21 599
Precuneus 0 −63 36 12.01 >8.21 614
Lingual gyrus L −6 −75 −3 8.07 7.43 162
Middle occipital R 42 −84 18 5.98 5.7 30
Middle occipital L −39 −90 9 5.1 4.92 13
Cerebellum L −15 −78 −30 9.88 >8.21 186
Cerebellum R 18 −81 −33 10.04 >8.21 219
Item-wise Group#1
Anterior insula L −39 21 −9 9.83 >8.21 767
Inferior frontal gyrus L −45 42 −12 8.71 7.64
Middle frontal L −42 18 42 10.64 >8.21 248
Superior medial frontal cortex 0 42 45 10.89 >8.21 1,239
Superior medial frontal R 12 18 54 7.67 6.90
Inferior frontal gyrus R 45 27 −12 9.33 >8.21 492
Anterior insula R 30 24 −12 8.19 7.27
Middle frontal R 39 24 39 6.68 6.14 148
Ventral striatum R 9 3 0 6.33 5.86 59
Caudate R 12 9 12 5.13 4.86
Caudate L −12 12 15 6.64 6.11 54
Ventral striatum L −6 0 −3 5.70 5.35
Middle cingulate 0 −18 39 7.00 6.39 45
Middle temporal cortex L −54 −30 −15 5.96 5.56 20
TPJ-angular/supramarginal gyrus R 60 −45 36 8.02 7.15 258
Middle temporal cortex R 48 −48 18 5.12 4.86
TPJ-angular/supramarginal gyrus L −54 −51 30 10.64 >8.21 412
Precuneus L −6 −60 33 8.87 7.74 413
Lingual gyrus L
(Continues)




x y z T Z Cluster
Middle occipital R
Middle occipital L
Cerebellum L −15 −78 −30 8.08 7.20 145
Cerebellum R 15 −78 −30 8.35 7.39 199
Subject-wise Group#2
Inferior frontal gyrus L −45 36 −6 8.84 7.80 469
Anterior insula L −36 27 −3 7.27 6.64
Middle frontal L −39 15 39 7.18 6.57 106
Middle frontal L −36 60 −3 5.76 5.42 19
Superior medial frontal cortex 0 45 33 10.64 >8.21 758
Superior medial frontal R 15 21 63 5.18 4.93
Inferior frontal gyrus R 45 27 3 7.31 6.67 290
Anterior insula R 30 21 −15 6.50 6.03
Middle frontal R 42 18 36 5.36 5.08 17
Ventral striatum R 6 0 −3 6.00 5.62 32
Caudate R 12 9 9 5.35 5.07
Ventral striatum L −6 0 0 5.84 5.49 32
Caudate R −12 6 12 5.63 5.31
Middle cingulate 0 −18 39 6.38 5.93 16
Middle temporal cortex L
TPJ-angular/supramarginal gyrus R 63 −51 24 7.93 7.15 153
Middle temporal cortex R
TPJ-angular/supramarginal gyrus L −57 −51 33 10.36 >8.21 242
Precuneus L −6 −51 33 7.78 7.03 261
Lingual gyrus L −9 −75 −3 6.09 5.70 19
Middle occipital R
Middle occipital L
Cerebellum L −18 −78 −33 7.85 7.08 115
Cerebellum R 24 −75 −33 7.90 7.12 96
Itemwise Group#2
Inferior frontal gyrus L −45 42 −6 8.52 7.50 588
Anterior insula L −27 24 −9 7.81 7.00
Middle frontal L −39 15 39 6.75 6.19 94
Superior medial frontal cortex L 0 39 42 9.61 >8.21 823
Superior medial frontal L −3 33 48 9.34 >8.21
Inferior frontal gyrus R 42 33 −3 7.90 7.06 283
Anterior insula R 33 21 −15 7.43 6.72
Middle frontal R 36 18 36 5.53 5.20 15
Caudate R 6 −6 −12 6.91 6.32 55
Ventral striatum L 9 0 −3 6.39 5.91
Ventral striatum L −6 0 0 6.03 5.62
Caudate R
Middle cingulate
Middle temporal cortex L
(Continues)
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the respective contrasts and consisted each of a sphere of contiguous
voxels, 5 mm in radius. This procedure has two advantages: First, by
using the ROIs from the subject-wise analysis, we might be able to
explain differences between item- and subject-wise analyses that are
due to low-level features. Second, the data of the regression analysis
is based on independently defined ROIs. To test whether the activa-
tions can be additionally explained by linguistic factors each item was
coded by at least two researchers in 9 different features. They com-
prised the following set of variables and were coded for each of the
stories (spoken text, empathy contrast) and questions (written text,
ToM contrast): number of words, characters, sentences, syllables
(as measures of the amount of spoken or written text), predicates,
tenses, passives, conjunctives and complexity (as measures of syntac-
tic difficulty). Additionally, for the empathy contrast three general fea-
tures were coded to characterize the video material: duration of the
video, motion and velocity of the narrator's movement. In the follow-
ing three passages, we further illustrate the choice of these features.
The amount of spoken or written text, for example, measured by
the number of words, has been used as a proxy for constituent size
(Goucha & Friederici, 2015; Pallier, Devauchelle, & Dehaene, 2011).
These studies showed that increasing constituent size is associated
with an increase of neural activation in left hemispheric cortical areas
such as the inferior frontal gyrus, temporo-parietal junction, superior
temporal sulcus and temporal pole, regions that are also engaged dur-
ing empathy and theory of mind processing. Therefore, we tested
whether differences in the number of words, characters, sentences or
syllables can account for the observed effects in the EmpaTom task.
Five additional features measure aspects of syntactic complexity,
that is, number of predicates, tenses, passives, conjunctives and com-
plexity (lexical diversity: type token ratio). Syntactic complexity is cor-
related with working memory load indicated by higher error rates and
longer processing times in sentence comprehension. FMRI studies
showed that this effect modulates the neural activity in the left infe-
rior frontal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, and temporo-parietal junction
(Meltzer, McArdle, Schafer, & Braun, 2010; Newman, Malaia, Seo, &
Cheng, 2013) suggesting the possibility that items with higher
syntactic complexity influence activation patterns in the same cortical
areas that are engaged during empathy and ToM processing.
Besides to low-level features that are associated to spoken and
written text, we additionally selected three general low-level features
that characterized the video material: duration of videos, motion and
velocity of the narrator's movement. Emotionality may not only be
communicated by language and facial expression but is also facilitated
by spontaneous gestures and movements (Dick, Solodkin, & Small,
2010). Gesture comprehension is supported by a cortical network com-
prising the bilateral temporo-parietal junction, bilateral superior parietal
lobe, left inferior and middle frontal gyrus, and the left superior and
middle temporal gyrus (Yang, Andric, & Mathew, 2015). Because of the
considerable overlap with empathy related activity, we included these
factors into the regression analysis to rule out that differences in the
video material account for the observed empathy effects.
We performed stepwise forward/backward regression analyses with
the item responses in the previously defined ROIs as dependent vari-
ables and condition and the selected features as independent variables.
Stepwise regression is an iterative process of selecting and eliminating
multiple variables depending on the model's best fit to the data. It is par-
ticularly useful in cases where there are large numbers of predictors. In
each step, a predictor is added to the regression which most improves
the fitting of the data (forward selection). To avoid overfitting, the pre-
dictors are excluded from the model if their contribution to predicting
the outcome becomes non-significant (backward elimination). We used
rather strict entry and removal criteria that were based on the number
of predictors to account for multiple testing (theory of mind (10 predic-
tors): entry/removal: p = .005/p = .01; empathy (13 predictors): entry/
removal: p = .0038/p = .0077). The analyses were performed on IBM
SPSS Statistics for Windows, version 26.0 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY).
2.7 | Optimized sets of stimuli
The results of the item analyses were used to identify optimal sets of




x y z T Z Cluster
TPJ-angular/supramarginal gyrus R 63 −51 27 5.66 5.31 40
Middle temporal cortex R
TPJ-angular/supramarginal gyrus L −54 −51 33 9.92 >8.21 214




Cerebellum L −15 −78 −30 7.94 7.09 99
Cerebellum R 15 −81 −30 7.42 6.71 108
Abbreviations: FWE, family-wise error; TPJ, temporoparietal junction/supramarginal gyrus.
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TABLE 2 Whole brain subject- and item-wise random effects results for Questions ToM > non ToM The results are reported at a voxel-level
threshold of p < .001 uncorrected together with an FWE-corrected cluster threshold of p < .05
H
MNI coordinates
x y z T Z Cluster
Subject-wise Group#1
Rectus R 3 57 −18 7.71 7.15 38
Superior medial frontal L −9 54 24 13.72 >8.21 1,185
Superior frontal L −9 54 33 12.34 >8.21
Superior medial frontal R 9 57 21 11.73 >8.21
Inferior frontal gyrus R 54 30 3 6.24 5.92 52
Inferior frontal gyrus L −51 24 6 10.32 >8.21 226
Inferior frontal gyrus L −45 27 −9 9.93 >8.21
Temporal pole R 51 9 −33 14.68 >8.21 121
Temporal pole L −51 3 −30 12 >8.21 79
Postcentral L −54 −6 48 6.05 5.76 13
Middle cingulate 0 −15 39 8.56 7.81 50
Supplementary motor area R 6 −24 57 5.37 5.17 10
TPJ-middle temporal R 51 −30 −3 10.61 >8.21 640
TPJ-superior temporal R 48 −18 −9 9.81 >8.21
TPJ-angular gyrus R 63 −45 21 7.76 7.19
Posterior cingulate/precuneus L −6 −51 30 16.38 >8.21 328
TPJ-angular gyrus L −51 −57 24 15.81 >8.21 1,019
TPJ-middle temporal L −48 −30 −3 10.49 >8.21
TPJ-superior temporal L −60 −18 −6 9.53 >8.21
Cuneus L −9 −93 30 5.7 5.45 10
Cuneus R 15 −87 39 6.11 5.82 24
Cerebellum L −27 −81 −36 14.65 >8.21 101
Cerebellum R 27 −78 −33 15.82 >8.21 145
Item-wise Group#1
Superior medial frontal L −12 57 36 15.99 >8.21 1,241
Rectus R 3 57 −18 7.97 7.12
Superior frontal L −6 54 18 14.93 >8.21
Superior medial frontal L −9 30 57 10.34 >8.21
Inferior frontal gyrus R 48 30 −9 6.39 5.91 32
Inferior frontal gyrus L −54 24 6 11.74 >8.21 243
Inferior frontal gyrus L −45 30 −9 10.62 >8.21
Temporal pole R 51 9 −33 16.30 >8.21 125
Temporal pole L −54 24 6 11.74 >8.21 243
Postcentral L
Middle cingulate 0 −12 39 8.63 7.58 39
Supplementary motor area R
TPJ-middle temporal R 48 −30 −3 10.40 >8.21 332
TPJ-superior temporal R 63 −51 21 6.42 5.93 71
TPJ-angular gyrus R 66 −42 24 5.77 5.40
Posterior cingulate/precuneus L −9 −51 33 12.16 >8.21 253
TPJ-angular gyrus L −51 −54 24 15.64 >8.21 889
TPJ-superior temporal L −60 −15 −9 9.40 >8.21
TPJ-middle temporal L −48 −33 −6 8.82 7.71
(Continues)




x y z T Z Cluster
Cuneus L
Cuneus R
Cerebellum L 51 9 −33 16.30 >8.21 125
Cerebellum R 27 −78 −36 16.88 >8.21 135
Subject-wise Group#2
Rectus R
Superior medial frontal L −6 57 21 13.83 >8.21 1,008
Superior medial frontal R 6 57 15 12.56 >8.21
Supplementary motor area L −6 15 60 10.91 >8.21
Inferior frontal gyrus R 57 27 0 5.45 5.16 15
Inferior frontal gyrus L −48 27 0 10.69 >8.21 206
Temporal pole R 51 12 −27 14.12 >8.21 147
Temporal pole L −51 9 −30 11.66 >8.21 446
Postcentral L −51 −6 51 5.93 5.56 15
Middle cingulate 0 −15 39 8.55 7.60 68
TPJ-middle temporal R 48 −27 −6 11.15 >8.21 446
TPJ-angular gyrus R 66 −45 18 6.52 6.05
TPJ-superior temporal R 66 −36 24 6.42 5.97
Posterior cingulate/precuneus L −6 −51 33 12.45 >8.21 251
TPJ-angular gyrus L −45 −54 24 13.41 >8.21 778
TPJ-middle temporal L −54 −27 −3 9.16 >8.21
TPJ-superior temporal L −63 −15 −15 6.43 5.98
Cuneus L −9 −93 30 5.69 5.36 17
Cuneus R
Cerebellum L −27 −78 −36 13.97 >8.21 67
Cerebellum R 30 −78 −36 14.07 >8.21 79
Item-wise Group#2
Rectus 0 51 −21 7.49 6.76 42
Superior medial frontal L −6 54 27 16.11 >8.21 1,213
Superior medial frontal R 6 60 15 12.49 >8.21
Superior medial frontal L −6 45 45 12.04 >8.21
Inferior frontal gyrus R 54 27 0 6.45 5.96 34
Inferior frontal gyrus L −45 30 −6 11.88 >8.21 264
Inferior frontal gyrus L −51 24 6 10.28 >8.21
Temporal pole R 51 12 −33 14.74 >8.21 164
Temporal pole L −48 12 −33 14.32 >8.21 97
Postcentral L −39 −21 21 5.68 5.33 14
Middle cingulate L −3 −12 39 7.18 6.52 45
Supplementary motor area R
TPJ-middle temporal R 45 −27 −6 11.24 >8.21 368
TPJ-superior temporal R 60 −54 24 6.79 6.23
TPJ-angular gyrus R 66 −42 18 6.21 5.77
Posterior cingulate/precuneus L −9 −51 33 12.14 >8.21 261
TPJ-angular gyrus L −48 −57 27 13.33 >8.21 653
(Continues)
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(empathy and ToM), that is, those items that produce the greatest
activation in the theory of mind and empathy network. More specifi-
cally, we selected the items with the highest beta values in the experi-
mental conditions and the lowest beta values in the control conditions
for the regions of interest that were defined on the basis of the
subject-wise random effects analyses of Sample 1. We identified two
sets, one with 48, the other with 40 videos and questions (see Data S2
and S3). Additionally, to allow for use in longitudinal designs, we identi-
fied two parallel sets of stimuli, that is, two sets with 48 and two sets
with 40 videos and questions each (see Data S4 and S5). The sets with
a reduced number of trials still reliably produce activations in the theory
of mind and empathy network, and might therefore particularly be use-
ful in clinical studies. The parallel sets are matched regarding on the
extent to which they recruit the respective ROIs as well as to behav-
ioral measures (affect, concern, confidence ratings and response time,
accuracy in the questions), linguistic factors (number of words, charac-
ters, sentences, syllables, predicates, tenses, passives, conjunctives, and
complexity) and general characteristics of the stimulus material (gender
and age of narrator, movement and velocity, duration of the video).
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Behavioral data
We first analyzed data from Sample 1. To test for emotion effects, we
compared the valence ratings after emotional (M = −1.11, SD = .61) and
neutral videos (M = .43, SD = .39), which yielded significant differences in
subject- (F[1,177] = 794.29, p < .001) and item-wise analyses (F
[1,59] = 1,243.56, p < .001). To test, whether performance in ToM and
nonToM questions differed, we compared RTs and accuracies in ToM
(M = 8,450.58 ms, SD = 1,346.38; M = 64.05%, SD = 12.31, chance
level = 33.33%) and nonToM questions (M = 8,490.93, SD = 1,272.54 ms;
M = 55.05%, SD = 16.11, chance level = 33.33%). In RTs we found no sig-
nificant differences in subject- (F[1,177] = .63, p > .40) and item-wise ana-
lyses (F[1,59] < .001, p > .99). Accuracies, in contrast, were higher in the
ToM than in the nonToM conditions in both subject- (F(1,177 = 69.20,
p < .001) and item-wise analyses (F[1,59] = 14.92, p < .001), indicating that
the nonToM questions were slightly more difficult. Crucially, the subject-
and item-wise analyses were in line with each other for all measures.
The pattern of results was the same in Sample 2. For emotion
effects, the valence ratings after emotional (M = −1.00, SD = .70) and
neutral videos (M = .48, SD = .42), yielded significant differences in
subject- (F[1,129] = 470.18, p < .001) and item-wise analyses
(F[1,59] = 937.13, p < .001). Performance in ToM (M = 8,471.71 ms,
SD = 1,334.42; M = 67.14%, SD = 11.85, chance level = 33.33%) and
nonToM questions (M = 8,563.97, SD = 1,329.51 ms; M = 57.43%,
SD = 15.30, chance level = 33.33%) resembled Sample 1. RTs did not
differ in subject- (F[1,129] = 2.40, p > .10) and item-wise analyses
(F[1,59] < .81, p > .35), but accuracies were higher in the ToM than in
the nonToM conditions in both subject- (F(1,129 = 53.96, p < .001)
and item-wise analyses (F[1,59] = 16.08, p < .001). Again, the subject-
and item-wise analyses were perfectly in line with each other.
3.2 | Neuroimaging data
3.2.1 | Empathy
We performed whole brain subject- and item-wise random effects
analyses, first on the data set acquired in Sample 1 (see Figure 3a,b
and Table 1). The results show activity in the typical empathy rela-
ted neural network for emotional versus neutral videos, both
across subjects and across items. This network includes bilateral AI,
ACC/DMPFC, IFG, and dorsal portions of TPJ/SMG. A few regions
showed significant activity only in the subject-wise, but not the item-
wise analysis, including lingual and middle occipital gyrus, which
would suggest that the activation is due to features of some specific
stimuli and that it is not generalizable. The pattern of results was the
same in Sample 2 (see Figure 3c,d and Table 1).
3.2.2 | Theory of mind
As for empathy, we first performed whole brain subject- and item-
wise random effects analyses on the data set acquired in Sample
1 (see Figure 4a,b and Table 2). All of the brain regions typically
involved in ToM were activated for ToM questions compared to fac-
tual reasoning questions, both across subjects and across items. These




x y z T Z Cluster
TPJ-superior temporal L −48 −33 −3 9.77 >8.21
TPJ-middle temporal L −63 −18 −9 7.13 6.49
Cuneus L
Cuneus R
Cerebellum L −24 −78 −36 12.79 >8.21 76
Cerebellum R 27 −78 −36 13.29 >8.21 89
Abbreviations: FWE, family-wise error; TPJ, temporoparietal junction/supramarginal gyrus.
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and anterior MPFC. Brain regions active for subject-wise analysis and
not item-wise analysis include parts of the supplementary motor area,
postcentral gyrus, and cuneus. The pattern of results was the same in
Sample 2 (see Figure 4c,d and Table 2).
3.2.3 | Regression analysis
We performed stepwise forward/backward regression analyses on
the data set acquired in Sample 2 for the empathy (23 ROIs) and ToM
F IGURE 3 Consistency of the empathy related activation patterns (video: emotional > neutral) across item-wise (a) and subject-wise
(b) analyses in Sample 1 (N = 178) and in Sample 2 (N = 130) (c, d, respectively). The results show activity in the empathy related network for
emotional versus neutral videos, both across subjects and across items. This network includes anterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex/
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus and dorsal portions of the temporoparietal junction (supramarginal gyrus)
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(23 ROIs) contrast. All ROIs were independently defined by the
whole-brain subject-wise analysis of Sample 1. The results show that
for both contrasts condition is almost the only predictor for all regions
that were tested (see Table 3). For the ToM contrast, activity in the
left cuneus is positively associated with the number of syllables of the
questions, the activity in the right cuneus is positively associated with
the number of words and the activity in the supplementary motor
area could not be explained by either condition or by any other stimu-
lus characteristic. For the empathy contrast, three ROIs (left middle
temporal cortex, bilateral middle occipital cortex) could not be
F IGURE 4 Consistency of the theory of mind related activation patterns (question: ToM > nonToM) across item-wise (a) and subject-wise
(b) analyses in Sample 1 (N = 178) and in Sample 2 (N = 130) (c, d, respectively). The results show activity in the theory of mind related network
for mental state vs. factual reasoning questions, both across subjects and across items. This network included bilateral ventral temporoparietal
junction, superior temporal sulcus, temporal poles, precuneus and anterior medial prefrontal cortex. ToM, Theory of Mind
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TABLE 3 Results of the regression analyses
Coefficients
ROI H F p R2 Predictor β t p
Question ToM > non ToM
Rectus R 12.034 .001 .093 Condition .304 3.469 .001
Superior medial frontal L 247.114 <.001 .677 Condition .823 15.720 <.001
Superior frontal L 203.853 <.001 .633 Condition .796 14.278 <.001
Superior medial frontal R 147.355 <.001 .555 Condition .745 12.139 <.001
Inferior frontal gyrus R 35.606 <.001 .232 Condition .481 5.967 <.001
Inferior frontal gyrus L 120.307 <.001 .505 Condition .711 10.968 <.001
Inferior frontal gyrus L 147.889 <.001 .556 Condition .746 12.161 <.001
Temporal pole R 223.881 <.001 .655 Condition .809 14.963 <.001
Temporal pole L 159.097 <.001 .574 Condition .758 12.613 <.001
Postcentral L 12.593 .001 .096 Condition .311 3.549 .001
Middle cingulate 28.239 <.001 .193 Condition .439 5.314 <.001
Supplementary motor area R None
TPJ-middle temporal R 98.618 <.001 .455 Condition .675 9.931 <.001
TPJ-superior temporal R 71.325 <.001 .377 Condition .614 8.445 <.001
TPJ-angular gyrus R 27.034 <.001 .186 Condition .432 5.199 <.001
Posterior cingulate/precuneus L 107.008 <.001 .476 Condition .690 10.344 <.001
TPJ-angular gyrus L 148.454 <.001 .557 Condition .753 12.184 <.001
TPJ-middle temporal L 103.657 <.001 .468 Condition .684 10.181 <.001
TPJ-superior temporal L 59.992 <.001 .337 Condition .581 7.745 <.001
Cuneus L 15.237 <.001 .137 Syllables .354 4.294 <.001
.207 Condition .264 3.203 .002
Cuneus R 16.476 <.001 .123 Words .350 4.059 <.001
Cerebellum L 143.531 <.001 .549 Condition .741 11.980 <.001
Cerebellum R 165.993 <.001 .584 Condition .765 12.884 <.001
Video emotional > non emotional
Inferior frontal gyrus L 58.877 <.001 .333 Condition .577 7.673 <.001
Middle frontal L 18.694 <.001 .137 Condition .370 4.324 <.001
Anterior insula L 36.633 <.001 .237 Condition .487 6.052 <.001
Superior medial frontal L 59.271 <.001 .334 Condition .578 7.699 <.001
Superior medial frontal R 19.299 <.001 .141 Condition .375 4.393 <.001
Inferior frontal gyrus R 53.658 <.001 .313 Condition .559 7.325 <.001
Middle frontal R 13.047 <.001 .100 Condition .316 3.612 <.001
Anterior insula R 37.890 <.001 .243 Condition .493 6.156 <.001
Ventral striatum R 17.745 <.001 .131 Condition .362 4.212 <.001
Ventral striatum L 33.096 <.001 .219 Condition .468 5.753 <.001
Caudate L 12.161 .001 .093 Condition .306 3.487 .001
Caudate R 10.419 .002 .081 Condition .285 3.228 .002
Middle cingulate 8.856 .004 .070 Condition .264 2.976 .004
Middle temporal cortex L None
TPJ-angular/supramarginal R 17.682 <.001 .130 Condition .361 4.205 <.001
Middle temporal cortex R 15.180 <.001 .114 Condition .338 3.896 <.001
TPJ-angular/supramarginal L 78.740 <.001 .400 Condition .633 8.874 <.001
Precuneus 12.004 .001 .092 Condition .304 3.465 .001
(Continues)
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associated with any of the predictors. Low-level factors such as lin-
guistic or general characteristics do not show a major influence
regarding the activation across the empathy or ToM network.
4 | DISCUSSION
The present study aimed to probe the generalizability and reproduc-
ibility of the neural networks related to empathy and ToM. The results
demonstrate replicability of subject- and item-wise analyses of both
functions with AI, ACC/DMPFC, IFG, dorsal TPJ/SMG for empathy
and ventral TPJ, STG/STS, temporal poles and anterior and posterior
midline regions for ToM, arguing for generalizability of the brain acti-
vation patterns to the respective stimulus classes. Importantly, the
observed activity was not predicted by low-level stimulus characteris-
tics such as the number of words or syllables, corroborating the valid-
ity of the activation patterns. Furthermore, we used the item
information to construct stimulus sets that include the most effective
items to provide the most stable and reproducible results in future
studies employing the EmpaToM paradigm. Lastly, demonstrating
reproducibility of the findings, all of the above described results were
replicated in a second, independent participant sample.
The main result of the present study is the finding of consistent
activation patterns for empathy and ToM across subject- and item-
wise analyses. This consistency demonstrates that the observed net-
work activity is not due to idiosyncratic characteristics of (some of)
the utilized videos and questions, but is generalizable to the entire
populations of stimuli. One critical question here is what exactly
defines these stimulus populations. Just as the generalizability of
subject-wise analyses is limited by how well the participant sample
represents the population (e.g., the age range of 20–55 years in the
present study precludes conclusions about empathy and ToM
processing in older adults), generalizing the results to empathy induc-
ing or ToM demanding situations needs to be done with care, consid-
ering the breadth of situations covered in the applied stimuli. The
shown videos were created to resemble brief episodes of a (putatively
longer) complex conversation one might have with another person.
The ToM questions ask for aspects of the mental state of this person
that were not overtly described. While this enables generalizing to the
empathic sharing of others' affect as conveyed in language, prosody
and facial expression, it precludes generalizing to other forms in which
people express their emotions, such as gesture, body posture and
movement or the direct observation of emotional situations, for
instance, of injury. Moreover, the emotional videos in the EmpaToM
paradigm are negatively valenced which also precludes generalizing to
positive empathy, that is, sharing, or joining others' positive emotions.
The theory of mind questions aim at an understanding of a person's
mental states. Stimuli that target the prediction of a person's behavior
are not included in this task. In comparison to other tasks in theory of
mind, the items cannot generalize to mental state attributions that are
based on action observation as in social animations (e.g., Castelli et al.,
2000), or to conceptual knowledge about persons as in trait judg-
ments (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2002). Consequently, the stimuli of the
EmpaToM task do not elicit all possible forms of empathic responses
and theory of mind reasoning. A more comprehensive approach to
generate a random sample of items that is representative for theory
of mind and empathy might be realized by an ecological momentary
assessment (EMA) (Shiffman, Stone, & Hufford, 2008). This approach
involves repeated sampling of subject's social interactions in real time
over periodic intervals, thereby enabling a high ecological validity.
Future studies could therefore arrive at stronger conclusions about
the precise nature of the population of items.
However, given the amount of videos and questions (240 in total
for each type) and the fact that no situation was repeated, there is
considerable breadth within this conversation type situation. Comply-
ing with the call for “item-analyses with a larger and more variable set
of stimuli” (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011), the present results, thus,
expand previous reports of consistent activity for reading false-belief
(20 items; (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011)) and physical or emotional pain
stories (24 items each; (Bruneau et al., 2013)).
Another critical question pertains to possible confounds due to
the, in general, high error rates and the differences in behavioral per-
formance. The EmpaToM task was explicitly designed to be hard,
which makes it unique among other theory of mind tasks in functional
neuroscience in adults. In other tasks, for example, false belief or
social animations, healthy participants perform typically at 100% or
nearly 100% accuracy. The drawback of those measurements is that
they are not sensitive to pick up improvements in performance over
time, whereas the EmpaToM task can (Böckler et al., 2017; Trautwein
et al., 2020). Given that participants were less accurate in the nonToM
condition than in the ToM condition, one might think that the differ-
ential brain activation identified with the contrast (ToM > nonToM)
TABLE 3 (Continued)
Coefficients
ROI H F p R2 Predictor β t p
Lingual gyrus L 8.807 .004 .069 Condition .264 2.968 .004
Middle occipital R None
Middle occipital L None
Cerebellum L 45.261 <.001 .277 Condition .527 6.728 <.001
Cerebellum R 39.490 <.001 .251 Condition .501 6.284 <.001
Abbreviations: ROI, regions of interest; ToM, Theory of Mind; TPJ, temporoparietal junction/supramarginal gyrus.
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reflects the effect of general task difficulty. However, we think this is
unlikely because of the following reasons: First, prior to the fMRI
measurements, participants were sufficiently familiarized with the task
and the different conditions. Second, a previous study that validated
the EmpaToM task with other measures of empathy and theory of
mind did not detect any differences in accuracy (Kanske et al., 2015;
Exp. 1). In line with these results, subjects' confidence ratings, indicat-
ing their performance evaluation, were equal across all conditions,
meaning the participants did not evaluate the nonToM condition as
more difficult than the ToM condition. Finally, further results of this
study also showed that the theory of mind performance does posi-
tively correlate with the activity of the default mode network,
whereas areas in the default mode network typically tend to increase
in deactivation with increasing task difficulty (e.g., Buckner, 2008).
Activity in a few regions observed in the subject-wise analyses
was not present for the item-wise analyses. These include the supple-
mentary motor area, postcentral gyrus, and cuneus for ToM and lin-
gual and middle occipital gyrus for empathy. The results of the
regression analyses could partly explain this difference by showing
that activity in the bilateral cuneus was mainly due to the number of
syllables and words of the theory of mind and factual reasoning ques-
tions and not the condition difference itself. The lack of activation in
the other areas in the item-wise analyses suggests that their subject-
wise activation is due to specifics of the videos and questions used,
implying that they would not be activated by other empathy and ToM
stimuli. This is in line with the absence of these regions in empathy
and ToM meta-analyses (Bzdok et al., 2012; Lamm, Batson, & Decety,
2007; Schurz et al., 2014).
FMRI item-analyses allow an item-specific estimate for the neural
activity in a brain region which might serve as an indicator of the
regions function. As the items can be characterized not only regarding
their experimental category but also regarding multiple other features
(e.g., constituent size, or syntactic complexity), it is possible to deter-
mine which features best predict the neural response in each brain
region (see e.g., Bruneau et al., 2013; Dodell-Feder et al., 2011). This
allowed us to test whether low-level stimulus characteristics, which
might confound the manipulation of empathy and ToM, have contrib-
uted to some of the activations attributed to the experimental condi-
tion. The results of the regression analyses yielded the experimental
condition as strongest predictor (by far) for all of the observed activa-
tion clusters, demonstrating convincingly that none of the low-level
predictors exert major influence on the results. As it is impossible to
completely match emotional and neutral videos without erasing the
difference in emotionality, this is an important, reassuring finding. Also
with regard to ToM, ruling out the possibility that linguistic character-
istics account for the ToM effects is important, because of the consid-
erable overlap of ToM related activity with regions involved in
language processing, particularly in the temporal cortex and TPJ
(Friederici, 2011; Molenberghs, Johnson, Henry, & Mattingley, 2016;
Schurz et al., 2014) and the discussion of the intricate relationship of
ToM and language processing (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Ferstl & von
Cramon, 2002). The results of the regression analyses showed that
low-level features do not explain the neural response in the ToM or
empathy regions. A different approach could also focus on high-level
features, such as whether the ToM questions include true or false
belief, or first or second order reasoning. This approach might, there-
fore, be of particular importance for future research on social cogni-
tion identifying areas with specific functions for ToM and empathy
processing.
Given the recent discussions about difficulties in replicating psy-
chological findings (Lindsay, 2015; Open Science Collaboration, 2015),
we aimed at testing the stability of our findings in a within-study
replication. Indeed, the results from a second independent sample cor-
roborated the conclusions of the first sample, that is, reproducible
neuroimaging results in subject- and item-wise analyses that are inde-
pendent from low-level stimulus characteristics. Furthermore,
addressing the critique of small sample sizes in many neuroimaging
studies (Button et al., 2013), the two samples we assessed were rela-
tively large in comparison to most fMRI investigations (which mostly
include <40 participants) (David et al., 2013). Thus, the present study
lends a high degree of trustworthiness to the observed neural activa-
tion patterns for empathy and ToM. Future studies could of course fur-
ther strengthen this conclusion, for instance by probing the test–retest-
reliability of the results, which has been shown to be highly variable
across brain regions and experimental paradigms (Plichta et al., 2012).
The specific activation patterns observed for empathy and ToM
are not only consistent across subject- and item-wise analyses, but
also correspond to the typical networks associated with the two func-
tions in large-scale meta-analyses (Bzdok et al., 2012; Lamm et al.,
2011; Molenberghs, Johnson, et al., 2016; Schurz et al., 2014). An
interesting aspect is that the meta-analyses suggest the existence of
core networks for empathy (AI, IFG, ACC) and ToM (TPJ, MPFC), acti-
vated for all operationalizations of the respective functions, and
extended networks that include additional regions (for empathy:
DMPFC, dorsal TPJ/SMG; for ToM: STG/STS, temporal poles,
precuneus), when pooling across the different operationalizations.
Assuming that most experimental paradigms capture specific compo-
nent processes of full-fledged empathy or ToM (Schurz & Perner,
2015), the finding of activation in the extended networks for the
EmpaToM suggests that the task comprehensively captures the com-
plexity of these two social capacities (as is the case for other para-
digms aiming at ecological validity (Wolf, Dziobek, & Heekeren,
2010)). Furthermore, taking the independence of the neural bases of
empathy and ToM into account (Kanske et al., 2015; Kanske et al.,
2016) and observing the two networks in both types of analyses here,
corroborates the assumption that empathy and ToM are distinct social
functions, possibly serving specific purposes in social encounters, for
example, establishing the motivation for cooperation and enhancing
prosocial behavior (Kanske, Bockler, & Singer, 2017; Tusche, Bockler,
Kanske, Trautwein, & Singer, 2016).
The results of the item-analysis made it possible to select those
videos and questions that elicit the most prototypical responses in terms
of activation in the neural networks that meta-analyses have associated
with empathy and ToM (Bzdok et al., 2012; Lamm et al., 2011; Schurz
et al., 2014) and in behavior. To avoid circularity, we selected the stimuli
based on Sample 1 and tested them in the independent Sample
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2, showing strong and consistent activation patterns across the two sam-
ples. This way, we could form several optimized stimulus sets for future
usage in specific settings. In particular, the short versions of the task
enable testing special populations with reduced attention spans, for
instance, in psychopathology (Preckel, Kanske, Singer, Paulus, & Krach,
2016) or assessing multiple tasks, including the EmpaToM, within one
session, for instance, to predict social behavior based on empathic and
ToM capabilities (Tusche et al., 2016). The optimized parallel sets could
be applied in longitudinal designs, including intervention research.
To conclude, by replicating the empathy and ToM related neural
networks across item- and subject-wise analyses and demonstrating
their independence from low-level stimulus characteristics, the pre-
sent results contribute methodologically to the social neuroscience lit-
erature and add to our understanding of these social capacities as
distinct functions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This study forms part of the ReSource Project, headed by Tania Singer.
Data for this project were collected between 2013 and 2016 at the for-
mer Department of Social Neuroscience at the Max Planck Institute for
Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences Leipzig. Tania Singer (Principal
Investigator) received funding for the ReSource Project from the
European Research Council (ERC) under the European Community's
Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007–2013) ERC grant agreement
number 205557. M.G.T. is supported by the Austrian Science Fund's
Doctoral College “Imaging the Mind” (FWF-W1233). P.K. is supported
by German Federal Ministry of Education and Research within the
ASD-Net (BMBF FKZ 01EE1409A), the German Research Council
(Heinz Maier-Leibnitz Prize KA 4412/1-1) and Die Junge Akademie at
the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities and the
German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina. We wish to thank
the entire ReSource support team for help in the organization of the
study, in particular, we thank Nicole Pampus, Manuela Hoffmann and
Sylvie Neubert for help with the data acquisition. The data of this study
are available from the authors upon reasonable request.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Conceptualization, all authors; Data curation, F.M.T., A.B.R., P.K.; For-
mal analysis, M.G.T., P.K., F.M.T.; Funding Acquisition, T.S.; Investiga-
tion, F.M.T., A.B.R., P.K.; Methodology, F.M.T., A.B.R., P.K.; Project
administration, T.S., F.M.T., A.B.R., P.K.; Resources, T.S.; Supervision,
T.S., P.K.; Validation, M.G.T.; Visualization, M.G.T.; Writing—original
draft preparation, P.K., M.G.T.; Writing—review and editing, all authors.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The data of this study are available from the authors upon reasonable
request.
ORCID




1 Please note that sample 1 in the present study is based on the same par-
ticipant sample as described in Kanske et al. (2015). Importantly how-
ever, the analyses and results described in the present study are novel
and have not been described or shown elsewhere.
2 In contrast to empathy, compassion is defined as feelings of warmth and
care, including the motivation to improve the other's wellbeing (Singer &
Klimecki, 2014).
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